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Abstract 
The discussion on practice has a long tradition in the history of Western philosophy. However, from 
Marx, practical philosophy has began a special research of direction of philosophy. Marxist philosophy 
has realized the revolution of philosophy history with its view of practical activity. But as far as the 
concept of practice is concerned, it is Hegel’s view of practice that is fully discussed and can be used as 
a source of Marxist philosophy of practice. Hegel takes free will as the essence of man, and the 
practice of rational choice itself is not only a manifestation of freedom, but also a manifestation of the 
whole essence of man. Therefore, Hegel’s practice not only contains theory, but also manifests through 
intermediary. 
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1. Introduction 
The uniqueness of human beings lies in practical activities and the continuous evolution and 
development of human society brought about by practical activities. The history of human practice 
embodies the full nature of man. However, it is a matter of modern times for human beings to reflect on 
their own practical activities from a theoretical perspective, especially at the level of philosophy. 
Suining said that the scientific view of practice was laid by Marx and Engels, and this is why Marxist 
philosophy is the great revolution in the history of philosophy. The theoretical source of this revolution 
of philosophy is Hegel’s view of practice. Therefore, studying Hegel’s view of practice has profound 
theoretical significance for understanding the philosophical revolution realized by Marxist philosophy. 
 
2. Purpose Is the Nature of Practical Activities 
Practical activities constitute the whole essence of human beings, and the purpose is the essential 
characteristics of practical activities. In Hegel, it is of great significance to engage in the production and 
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use of tools for production activities, but only perceptual activities can not constitute a practical activity 
as the essence of human beings, and constitute the essence of human beings. Hegel also examines human 
activities from the essence of human freedom. He believes that as the essence of human beings, the 
essence of practical activities lies in their purpose. “Humans have their own purpose because they have 
something ‘sacred’ in themselves - that is what we call ‘rational’ from the beginning; and from its activity 
and conscious power, called ‘freedom’” (Note 2). That is to say, since people are free in essence, and the 
whole essence of human beings lies in the practical activities of human beings, the freedom of human 
beings lies in the “rationality” of human beings. The reason why practical activities are the essence of 
human beings, the reasoning people’s practical activities has rational power. The power of human reason 
is the embodiment of the essence of human freedom. “The highest content that can be mastered in the 
subject can be named ‘freedom’. The soul is the supreme rule of freedom” (Note 3). “World history is 
nothing more than the progress of the ‘freedom’ consciousness; this kind of progress is something we 
must recognize in its inevitability” (Note 4). 
Freedom, as the core issue of practice, was explicitly raised and discussed at Kant. In Kant, freedom as 
the principle of the will shows that “pure reason has the power of practice” (Note 5). This kind of pure 
reason contains the idea of combining reason and practice. However, “freedom” in Kant’s ideology is a 
pure form that transcends all specific content, and “practice” also mainly refers to the moral cultivation of 
the human heart. Therefore, “freedom” can only be a moral axiom for Kant, and can only be in the distant 
world. In Hegel’s view, the pure form of rebellion against all content is not “freedom,” but rather rather 
“willful”. Of course, in Hegel’s view, “freedom” is not just a subjective thing, or just for the purpose of 
form. “The waywardness” is a violation of reason, “not because of the rationality of the will, but by the 
occasional motive and the dependence of this motive on the perceptual external world” (Note 6). In fact, 
reason is the foundation of human beings. It is because of reason that people have the will and action of 
being free. Therefore, as a conscious activity with the purpose of freedom, practical activities are 
objective activities that contain rational knowledge. Therefore, freedom itself unifies understanding and 
practice. 
Therefore, the true “freedom” that Hegel understands is to eliminate the subjective one-sidedness, and 
to eliminate the objective one-sidedness from the alienation of the object itself, to achieve unity and 
object unity through cognition and practice, and this unity it is specific and historical. Here, Hegel 
actually recognizes that not only the object has a “necessary kingdom” on the subject, but also that the 
subject itself has a “necessary kingdom” when it is self-objective. Therefore, when Hegel strives to 
realize the unity of the subject and the object, it does not contain the idea that “freedom is the 
understanding of inevitability”, and it implies the idea of changing the subjective world with the 
understanding of inevitability. As a kind of life, man is also dominated by nature like other species. 
However, people are knowing themselves and developing themselves in the constant understanding and 
transformation of the “inevitable world”, thus realizing of human beings of the whole essence. In short, 
freedom is constantly manifested through the practice of human beings under the control of rational 
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understanding. And rational understanding reflects the purpose to a certain extent, so the nature of 
freedom and the characteristics of practical activities are the purpose. 
 
3. Intermediary Is the Performance of Practical Activities 
Hegel’s great historical merit is to reveal the purpose of the characteristics of human practice, but the 
realization of the purpose without the intermediary is not acceptable. The creation and use of tools in the 
process of human beings engaged in purposeful practical activities are also a feature of human practice 
and a manifestation of practical activities. That is to say, the means used in specific practical activities 
constitute the specific process of the purposeful activities and also the purposeful practical activities. At 
the same time, Hegel also pointed out that in terms of the objective premise of means, the means is also 
the object, but it is not the original object of the unprocessed nature, but the “things established by the 
concept” (Note 7). Means is both an organic procedure to the purpose of the activity and an objective 
defined by the concept. Therefore, the intermediary has both the duality of the subject and the object, 
which makes the means become the intermediary that connects the subject and the object and makes it 
unified. 
The establishment of an intermediary is the advancement of the purpose of the activity, and is the 
beginning of the unity of the subject and the object. The subject is rational, so the subject is always 
purposeful. However, when the means are not established, the purpose of the subject can only be a 
subjective impulse. In this case, the objective world is the substance subjective world. Only by means of 
intermediary means, the elimination of the object’s dissident and the realization of freedom can realize 
the unity of the subject and the object. In Hegel, practical activities are just a kind of reasoning of logical 
activities, so the means of intermediary is only the middle term of such reasoning. He said, “The purpose 
is to combine objectiveness with objectivity and to combine with oneself in objectivity. Means is the 
middle term of inference” (Note 8). Hegel here raises practical activities to the height of logical reasoning 
to give understanding and give practice. Activity is the meaning of logical reasoning, which reveals the 
essence of human practice in the dimension of philosophy. As Lenin said, “People’s practical activities 
must make people’s consciousness repeat the various logical lattices in order to obtain the meaning of 
justice” (Note 9). However, the lattice in the logic has practical significance only in the logical deduction. 
As a medium term of time reasoning, means only has practical significance in practical activities. 
Therefore, the means only has the possibility of achieving the unity of the subject and the object in the 
static, and it does not have its reality. Only in the logic of practice dynamic, means become the subjects 
and objects of the connection, and it has the reality that the subject and the object are unified. 
Hegel also pointed out that the process of unification of subject and object is infinite, and there must be 
infinite progress of mediation in the process of infinite unity of subject and object. In order to achieve the 
unity of the subject and the object, we must resort to the intermediary, “a means of inserting their 
relationship between this objectivity and subjective purpose” (Note 10). But as Hegel pointed out, “this 
mean is also one that has been the object specified by the purpose”, so the objectivity and purpose of this 
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object must be inserted into a new means, so that it is endless. This constitutes infinite progression of the 
intermediary. According to the “infinite progress of the intermediary”, Hegel came to an important 
conclusion: all topics except the subject can be essentially a means. He wrote, “All objects are equally 
method of purpose, and an external purpose is achieved between them” (Note 11). This shows that the 
person who is the subject is the person himself, the realization process of human freedom and true 
liberation. In other words, in this process, only the person who is the subject cannot be used as a means 
and should not be used as a means. For the ultimate purpose of man, the realization of all externally 
limited purposes is a means. 
In terms of importance, although the means are not comparable to the purpose, and the means are 
subordinate to the purpose, as mentioned above, the means still have its special importance. Whether it is 
the ultimate liberation of mankind or the realization of the specific limited purpose of mankind, it is 
inseparable from the means and methods that are compatible with it, and it depends on the practical 
activities of creating and using means. Human beings can only obtain the right to survive in practice, and 
they can live freely and realize their own liberation. 
 
4. Practice Activities Contain and Exceed Theory 
In the view of practice, Hegel discards Kant’s thoughts. He pointed out that in terms of theoretical 
understanding, because Kant splits the connection between subject and object, “all knowledge is 
always subjective and beyond subjectivity. It is the external thing-in-itself, so that there are splits 
between rational understanding and practical activities. (Note 12) On the practical level, since the 
“self-awareness” that can carry out rational understanding in practice activities is also regarded as the 
object self, the practice activities have completely become a blind movement based on feelings. 
Therefore, the “freedom” and moral self-discipline pursued by Kant in the field of practice are actually 
the same law of self-determination of the will, and its essence is “A=A”, and there is no substantive 
content. This is actually the fact that specific truths and true freedoms have been pushed to the “other 
world”. 
Kant made three moral publicity in order to express his liberty and the sacredness of moral law in 
practice, namely, freedom of will, immortality of the soul, and existence of God. For Kant’s three moral 
publicity in practice, Hegel believes that this is the weakness of Kant’s satisfaction with subjective 
delusions. He believes that Kant’s so-called “self-physical” cannot be avoided by understanding and 
practice. Kang’s escaping from specific objects can only be set as unknowable. So that the division of 
subject and object, the division of theory and practice become two aspect of causality in each other. In 
Hegel’s view, the acquisition of truth and freedom relies on and grasps this unity. It is based on this that 
Hegel proposes that practical activities contain theory and higher than theory, thus revealing another 
characteristic of practical activities. He said, “The theoretical thing is essentially contained in the 
practice of things”. “If we do not have reason, we cannot have the will. On the contrary, the will 
contains theory in itself” (Note 13). At the same time, Hegel also pointed out that practice is higher 
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than theory, and the reason why practice is higher than theory is that practice “not only has universal 
qualifications, but also has absolute reality qualifications”. (Note 14) 
Hegel especially underscored that practical activities cannot be without theory. The practice itself is a 
free activity, or it is in freedom and constantly fulfills its own activities. Therefore, practical activities 
necessarily include understanding and grasping the elements of the subject and the fit. Otherwise, the 
subject will have no knowledge of the object and its own “necessary kingdom”, nor can it talk about 
purpose, and it does not matter how to establish a means to adapt to the purpose, and there is no 
practice for freedom and human liberation. It is precisely for the purpose of making the practical 
activities have the purpose and the means to adapt them to become the real activities of freedom and 
the practice of realizes freedom. Therefore, Hegel attach great importance to that the person who is the 
subject must undergo long-term training and rational training. The difference between Kant and Hegel 
in the relationship between theory and practice has had a tremendous impact on the development of 
philosophy. Starting from Kant, the rationality is excluded from the practice of trying to achieve 
freedom. This constitutes the anti-rationalism pursued by Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, as well as 
existentialism. This is not only a retrogression of Hegel, but also a retrogression of Kant’s philosophy. 
Hegel’s assertion that “human practice essentially contains theoretical things” is a correct summary of 
the theoretical practice of human practice and the history of human society. Try it out, human society 
begins with practical activities, and practical activities contain the elements of theory, although this 
theory is still in its infancy and does not resort to written language. However, with the development of 
human practice, the status and total use of theory in practice is not weakened, but instead plays an 
increasingly important role. Without the correct theory, practical activities have no correct and 
reasonable purpose, and practical activities cannot be called practice activities. Therefore, it is not wise 
to try to exclude the theoretical elements from the practical activities. It is just a kind of obscurantism 
that makes people back to the animal era. 
 
5. Summary 
Hegel’s view of practice basically involves the basic characteristics of human practice, and has unique 
ideas in the purpose and intermediary of practical activities. Of course, in terms of practical philosophy, 
Hegel’s contribution is far more than what is said in this article. For example, he does not set a rigid 
dogma for human activities, but tries to reveal that “people should respect himself and be able to match 
themselves. Got something noble”. However, it must be pointed out that Hegel’s view of practice is a 
head-on-stand. He attributes all human activities to the dialectical movement of absolute ideas. 
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